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ABSTRACT 
Best practices in digital forensics demand the use of write-blockers when creating forensic 
images of digital media, and this has been a core tenet of computer forensics training for 
decades. The practice is so ingrained that the integrity of images created without a write-blocker 
are immediately suspect. This paper describes a research framework that compares forensic 
images acquired with and without utilizing write-blockers in order to understand the extent of 
the differences, if any, in the resultant forensic copies. We specifically address whether 
differences are superficial or evidentiary, and we discuss the impact of admitting evidence 
acquired without write blocking. The experiments compare the changes made to a hard drive 
and flash drive when imaged and examined with a Windows-based forensics workstation. 
Keywords: Digital forensics, computer forensics, write-blocking, forensic image, forensic data 
acquisition 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The first phase of the computer forensics 
process - after identifying digital devices that 
might have a nexus to an investigation - is 
data acquisition. This action includes creating 
a forensically correct copy of the desired 
media and is typically achieved by obtaining a 
bit-stream image of the original data 
(Carlton, 2007). This activity is necessary in 
order to adhere to the mandate of conducting 
a forensic examination on a copy rather than 
on the original evidentiary media, where the 
copy is presumed to be identical to the 
original. Digital forensic examiners typically 
perform the imaging process by attaching the 
original storage medium (i.e., a hard drive or 
an external storage device) to a write-blocker 
that is, in turn, attached to a forensic 
workstation, and then employing software to 
create the forensic image. The intent of the 
write-blocker is to prevent the forensic 
workstation's software or operating system 
from making any inadvertent changes to the 
original media, including adding, deleting, or 
modifying any information (Forensic Focus, 
2010; Henry, 2009; Nelson, Phillips, & 
Steuart, 2010). 
Employing a write-blocker during the 
imaging process is so ingrained in our 
teaching, education, and practice that there is 
no known mention within the literature 
addressing the treatment of a forensic copy 
that has been made without a write-blocker. 
This omission raises many scientific questions: 
What happens if a disk or other media is 
imaged without benefit of a write-blocker? Is 
the copy tainted? If so, what is the extent of 
any contamination? Procedurally, if a device 
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is imaged without a write-blocker, should such 
evidence be discarded by an examiner or 
investigator, ignored by counsel, or challenged 
by the opposing party on the presumption 
that the image no longer represents the 
original media? If such a generalized objection 
were raised, how should a judge know whether 
to sustain or overrule the objection, and how 
should the party offering such evidence argue 
for the evidence's inclusion? 
These questions are not entirely 
hypothetical. The current Scientific Working 
Group on Digital Evidence (SWGDE) Best 
Practices for Computer Forensics document is 
clear that write-blockers should be used 
"when possible" (SWGDE, 2013, p. 7) 
without mention of the negative impacts of 
not using blockers. The Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE) specifically allow duplicates 
to be admitted as evidence to the same extent 
as the original unless legitimate questions can 
be raised as to the veracity of the copy (FRE, 
2013). Does the lack of a write-blocker 
undermine the veracity of a copy so as to 
make it ineffective as evidence? 
The National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) has detailed specifications 
on how to test hardware and software write-
blockers to validate their proper operation 
(NIST, 2003, 2004, 2005). They do not, 
however, describe the impact when write-
blockers are not employed. Thus, lack of write 
blocking remains a somewhat ambiguous 
state. 
In U.S. v. Labuda (2012), the only case we 
found where write blockers were specifically 
cited as an issue, a police forensic examiner 
examined a cell phone's memory card without 
making an image. While the defense expert 
challenged the police examiner's lack of 
process by directly examining the card, the 
evidence was nevertheless allowed. But the 
write-blocker was not a central point of the 
case and, therefore, this case does not appear 
to sufficiently answer the questions above. 
The study described in this paper includes 
experiments to test the scientific foundation 
behind the requirement to use write blockers 
and the assertion of their necessity. The 
testing framework is presented below in 
section 2. In section 3 of this paper, we 
discuss the results of our examination 
comparing images acquired with write-
blockers to those acquired without write-
blockers. Lastly, in section 4, we offer our 
conclusions. 
2. TESTING 
FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Test Philosophy 
Write blockers are used in digital forensic 
imaging based upon the hypothesis that 
changes will occur to the source media if write 
blockers are not employed. For testing 
purposes, the null hypothesis is that no 
changes will occur to the source media if a 
write blocker is not used. The authors 
designed a test framework in an attempt to 
test the null hypothesis, or to measure the 
amount of changes, if any, made to digital 
media during the process of making a 
forensically correct copy (i.e., a bit-stream 
image). The framework was necessary in order 
to ensure that the experiments are repeatable 
and reproducible. In this context, repeatable 
means that we can get the same result over 
and over, and reproducible means that other 
researchers can get the same results following 
our framework. Or, in the words of NIST 
(2001): 
... repeatability is defined as the 
ability to get the same test results on 
the same testing environment (same 
computer, disk, mode of operation, 
etc.). Reproducibility is defined as the 
ability to get the same test results on 
a different testing environment 
(different PC, hard disk, operator, 
etc.). (p. 7) 
The universe of possible testing 
environments is actually quite huge. As Lyle 
(2012) observes, there are many choices of 
(Figure 1): 
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Figure 1. A subset of forensic imaging variables. 
ext - Extended File System (Linux); exFAT - Extended File Allocation Table (Microsoft). 
FAT - File Allocation Table (Microsoft); FTK - Forensic Toolkit (AccessData). 
HFS - Hierarchical File System (Apple); IDE - Integrated Drive Electronics (Western Digital). 
NTFS - New Technology File System (Microsoft); SATA - Serial Advanced Technology Attachment. 
SCSI - Small Computer System Interface; TSK - The Sleuth Kit. 
USB - Universal Serial Bus. 
 
• Digital media storage technology (e.g., 
traditional spinning disk or flash/solid-
state devices) 
• File system type (e.g., FAT12/16/32, 
NTFS, HFS/HFS+, ext2/ext3/ext4, 
EXFAT, etc.) 
• Interface between digital media and 
forensic workstation (e.g., Firewire, IDE, 
SATA, SCSI, USB) 
• Forensic workstation operating system 
(e.g., Windows, Mac OS X, Unix, Linux) 
• Write-blocker type (e.g., the variety of 
software and hardware products) 
• Imaging software (e.g., dcfldd, dd, 
EnCase, FTK Imager, X-Ways Forensics) 
and hardware (e.g., Forensic Duplicator, 
Forensic Imager, Hardcopy, Shadow) 
• Analysis software (e.g., Autopsy/TSK, 
EnCase, FTK, ProDiscover, X-Ways 
Forensics) 
The non-exhaustive list above represents a 
subset of the variables and the options 
available, but even these represent more than 
5,000 configurations. Given the size of the test 
universe, we selected a small subset of media 
and designed a testing framework as a 
demonstration of possible further work. 
However, our media subset represents two of 
the most commonly used devices at the time 
of our study (i.e., a SATA hard disk and a 
USB flash drive). 
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2.2 Test Design 
As mentioned above, NIST  (2003, 2004, 
2005) has detailed functional and test plan 
specifications for hardware and software write 
blockers. The tests described here are not as 
thorough as the NIST tests because the point 
is not to validate functioning write blockers 
but to determine what changes occur on the 
target medium when write blockers are 
absent, either because they were never used or 
later found to be non-functional. 
The general testing process is 
straightforward: 
1. Prepare known data sets and write them 
to verified wiped storage devices. 
2. Take a bit-stream image of the storage 
device attached to the forensic 
workstation with a hardware write-
blocker. 
3. Take a bit-stream image of the storage 
device attached to the forensic 
workstation via the Universal Serial Bus 
(USB) port and a software write-blocker. 
4. Take a bit-stream image of the storage 
device attached to the forensic 
workstation via the USB port without use 
of either a hardware or software write-
blocker. 
5. Document hash value findings. 
2.3 Test Sets 
This project tested two different media types, 
namely, a hard disk drive (HDD) and a USB 
flash drive (also commonly known as a thumb 
drive). Two different test data sets were 
created, one for each device. Each test set had 
a valid file system and typical set of files in 
allocated and unallocated space, as an 
example of something that might be found in 
the field. 
The first media item was an 80 GB SATA 
Seagate ST380815AS hard drive. The drive 
was wiped to an all-zero state using the built-
in wiping function of EnCase. The wiped hard 
drive was then connected to a computer in 
order to install the Windows 7 Professional 
(32-bit version) operating system using the 
NTFS file system; default settings were 
accepted and all Windows drivers were 
installed. Microsoft Office 2010 was then 
installed; normal Office documents, including 
a mix of Word documents and Excel 
spreadsheets, were then written to the drive. 
Finally, the test team visited several typical 
Web sites such as asrock.com, bing.com, 
google.com, msn.com, newegg.com, 
windows.microsoft.com, and yahoo.com. This 
collection of information was designated HDD 
Data Set 0. 
The second media item was an 8 GB 
Kingston USB flash drive. The flash drive was 
attached to the forensic workstation and a full 
format performed from the Windows 
operating system, employing the FAT32 file 
system. A variety of files and documents were 
then copied to the drive, including a mix of 
Word documents, Excel documents, Microsoft 
OneNote files, Adobe Portable Document 
Format (PDF) files, PowerPoint files, and 
several image files. The flash drive was then 
properly ejected from the forensic 
workstation. This collection of information 
was designated USB Data Set 0. 
2.4 Image Creation 
Three bit-stream forensic images were 
acquired from each of the media items. In 
general, Image 0 (which served as the control 
set) was acquired using a hardware write-
blocker, Image 1 was acquired using software 
write blocking, and Image 2 was acquired 
without a write-blocker. All images were 
created using EnCase software. 
Hardware write blocking employed 
Tableau Forensic Bridges, described in more 
detail below. The Tableau hardware write-
block capabilities were validated prior to our 
tests. 
Software write blocking was accomplished 
by setting the Windows Registry key 
controlling the write status of the USB port, 
namely 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ 
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CurrentControlSet 
\Control\StorageDevicePolicies\WriteProtect. 
Setting this Registry key's value to 0x0 allows 
writing to the USB port and a value of 0x1 
disables writing. After making any change to 
the Registry key's value, the system was 
rebooted and the appropriate functionality 
verified. 
 
3. TESTS AND RESULTS 
3.1 Imaging and Hashes 
The SATA hard drive was connected to the 
forensic workstation's USB port using a 
Tableau T35e Forensic SATA/IDE Bridge. 
The T35e can operate with the write-block 
mode either ON or OFF; the write-blocking 
functionality was confirmed prior to running 
the tests. 
Image 0 was obtained by turning ON the 
write-block function of the T35e bridge. 
EnCase was used to acquire the image, 
producing both Message Digest #5 (MD5) 
and Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA-1) hashes 
(Table 1). 
Image 1 was obtained by turning OFF the 
write-block function on the bridge and, 
instead, setting the Windows registry key to 
write-block the USB port. After changing the 
Registry key, the forensic workstation was 
rebooted and the USB write-block 
functionality was tested prior to attaching the 
drive to the workstation. The image was 
acquired and hash values calculated using 
EnCase. 
Image 2 was obtained by turning OFF the 
write-block function of the bridge and leaving 
the Windows registry key related to the USB 
port's write capability at its normal setting. 
After changing the keys, the forensic 
workstation was rebooted and the USB write-
enable capability was tested. The image was 
acquired and hash values calculated using 
EnCase. 
Table 1  
HDD Image Hash Values 
HDD Image 0 (hardware write-blocker) 
MD5 F8BE2078382A68ADC792B734FFB480CD 
SHA-1 23812B61A41E01F61AF0DA048B80AD25F1D4C8BA 
HDD Image 1 (software write-blocker) 
MD5 F8BE2078382A68ADC792B734FFB480CD 
SHA-1 23812B61A41E01F61AF0DA048B80AD25F1D4C8BA 
HDD Image 2 (no write-blocker) 
MD5 CF4539F0E98E67F368E5EB1D3119EB03 
SHA-1 31CE3038803A8B4BE39FD197905123664C5C2C5C 
 
Image 0 of the USB flash drive was 
obtained by connecting the device to the 
forensic workstation's USB port using a 
Tableau T8 Forensic USB Bridge in write-
blocker mode. The write-blocking 
functionality was confirmed prior to running 
the tests. EnCase was used to acquire the 
image, producing both MD5 and SHA-1 
hashes (Table 2). 
Image 1 was obtained by plugging the 
flash drive directly into the USB port of the 
forensic workstation, after setting the 
Windows registry key to write-block the USB 
port. After changing the Registry key, the 
forensic workstation was rebooted and the 
USB write-block functionality was tested prior 
to plugging the flash drive into the 
workstation. The image was acquired and 
hash values calculated using EnCase. 
Image 2 was obtained by plugging the 
flash drive directly into the USB port of the 
forensic workstation, leaving the Windows 
registry key related to the USB port's write 
capability at its normal setting. After 
changing the key, the forensic workstation 
was rebooted and the USB write-enable 
capability was tested prior to plugging the 
flash drive into the workstation. The image 
was acquired and hash values calculated using 
EnCase. 
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Table 2  
USB Image Hash Values 
USB Image 0 (hardware write-blocker) 
MD5 1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0 
SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC 
USB Image 1 (software write-blocker) 
MD5 1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0 
SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC 
USB Image 2 (no write-blocker) 
MD5 1571CFD2F1B5E9F00FAAFCC266C85EE0 
SHA-1 7EE9467068D99795A43699B7E5CBDC53A7EA55EC 
3.2 HDD Results 
As the information in Table 1 shows, the 
hardware and software write-blocking function 
worked equally well in this test, in that the 
hash values of both Image 0 and Image 1 of 
the HDD matched. The hash value of Image 2 
(no write blocking) differed, indicating that 
there were differences between that image and 
the write-blocked images. 
Subsequent examination of the image files 
showed a number of differences between 
Image 2 and Images 0/1. First, Image 2 
contained an extra file, C\System Volume 
Information\MountPointManagerRemoteData
base that was not present on Images 0/1. 
Second, 358 individual files hashes were 
different on Image 2 compared to Images 0/1. 
It is noteworthy that all but one of the 
changed hashes were assigned to folders that 
generally do not have hashes; the one 
modified file was D\$Extend\$UsnJrnl·$J, 
which is a file that records when and what 
modifications are made to files and folders 
within Windows. 
3.3 USB Flash Drive Results 
As the information in Table 2 shows, all of 
the images of the flash drive yielded the same 
hash value. The individual file hashes were 
also examined to verify that there were no 
discrepancies. 
3.4 Test Universe and Summary 
Table 3 summarizes the test scenario in terms 
of forensic variables and parameters (based on 
Figure 1) and the results reported above
 
 
 
 
 Hard Disk Drive Flash Drive 
Device 
Interface 
SATA USB 
File System NTFS FAT32 
Workstation 
OS 
Windows 7 
Forensic 
Software 
Encase 
 Image 0 Image 1 Image 2 Image 0 Image 1 Image 2 
Connection SATA Bridge to USB USB Bridge to USB USB port 
Write-block Hardware Software None Hardware Software None 
Hash (MD5) F8BE...80CD CF45...EB03 1571...5EE0 
 
Table 3 
Test Universe and Result Summary 
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As noted earlier in this paper, there are so 
many choices and options in the test 
parameters that our study cannot be used to 
draw overly generalized conclusions (Lyle, 
2012). The test cases do, however, provide a 
framework for further research. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This study examined two imaging scenarios 
testing the results of imaging without a write 
blocker. In one case, no changes occurred to 
evidentiary media; in the second case, only 
minimal changes were made but not to user 
files where probative information - both 
incriminating and exculpatory - is likely to be 
found. Since the study looked at only two out 
of thousands of possible scenarios, additional, 
deeper studies with other devices and 
configurations are certainly in order so that a 
better understanding can be gained about the 
broad impact of inoperable or failed write-
blockers. 
It is also interesting to address the 
concept of repeatability in conducting forensic 
data acquisitions in the absence of write-
blockers. While two forensic images acquired 
from the same original media without use of a 
write-blocker will likely yield different hash 
values (i.e., digital signatures), this difference 
alone does not preclude a scientifically 
repeatable finding. Even with the different 
media hash values and differences in system 
attributes (such as last accessed date), 
repeatable findings remain intact for the 
content of stored files, file slack, the 
overwhelming majority of unallocated space, 
and unused space. In fact, the individual hash 
values of stored files remain identical when 
the images are compared. Therefore, a forensic 
examiner may present evidence of data 
contained within a stored file or the file slack 
associated with the file, and another forensic 
examiner will be able to duplicate these 
findings even if both examiners created images 
from the original media without using write-
blockers. The important lesson to learn is that 
differences in media hash values do not, by 
themselves, imply contamination of data. 
The intent of this study is not to suggest 
that the use of write-blockers is unnecessary 
but rather to test the assertion that the 
absence of effective write blocking causes 
insurmountable challenges to the veracity - 
and value - of digital evidence. While our test 
results show that some changes are made to 
digital media when write-blocking is not 
employed (or, presumably, when a write-
blocker fails), they also show that the original 
evidence is not tainted beyond use and, 
certainly, no additional content has been 
added to the medium. Thus, the results 
suggest, if a party objects to the introduction 
of a forensic image solely because of the lack 
of write-blocking, the burden of proof is on 
the objector to show how the value of the 
evidence has been diminished. 
This study is intended to help inform the 
dialogue about what is and is not best 
practices in digital forensics. There are many 
cases when write-blocking cannot be 
effectively used when analyzing or examining 
digital media - such as is sometimes the case 
with mobile devices, or when collecting 
volatile data or random access memory 
(RAM) - and practitioners need to understand 
the true impact of the absence of write 
blocking so that we can better defend our 
processes and examinations. 
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